Documents from 1997 to 2008 records the American and British governments case for going to war against Iraq on March 20, 2003.
Los Angeles, CA – WEBWIRE – Monday, March 20, 2023
“Blairs foreword to the dossier asserted that intelligence had established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had and was continuing to develop WMD.”
BACM Research – PaperlessArchives.com publishes a 3,128-page collection of documents highlighting the development of the American and British governments case for going to war against Iraq on March 20, 2003.
The collection can be found at:
The documents date from 1997 to 2008, most documents are from the year 2002. They include documents from the Executive Office of the President United States State Department, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the British Prime Ministers Office. The collection also contains American and British Reports reviewing the decisions and intelligence products produced leading p to the war.
Highlights among the documents include:
A memo written three days after George W. Bush was sworn into office, January 23, 2001, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Information Memo from Edward S. Walker, Jr. to Colin Powell, titled Origins of the Iraq Regime Change Policy”
A June 29, 2001 U.S. Department of State Memo from Robert J. Einhorn and James A. Larocco to Colin Powell, Update on Efforts to Prevent Iraqi Procurement of Aluminum Tubes
A July 27, 2001 U.S. Defense Department Memo from Donald Rumsfeld to Condoleezza Rice, Iraq. Rumsfeld recommends a Principals Committee meeting and then a National Security Council meeting on Iraq, because sanctions are failing, and Iraqs air defenses seem to be improving. He lists policy options, and says, Within a few years the U.S. will undoubtedly have to confront a Saddam armed with nuclear weapons (he also says that Iran will almost certainly have nuclear weapons by 2006) and that If Saddams regime were ousted, we would have a much-improved position in the region and elsewhere.
A December 17, 2001 U.S. Department of Defense Memo from Robert Andrews to Douglas Feith, Pre-emptive Operations. The Defense Departments Special Operations chief advises
Douglas Feith to read a conservative Catholic theologians upcoming op-ed asserting a moral justification for a pre-emptive strike against Iraq that demonstrates how pre-emptive action against Iraq fits into the just-war tradition.
A December 18, 2001 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Assessment, Europe: Key Views on Iraqi Threat and Next Steps. This intelligence assessment indicates that war against Iraq absent incontrovertible evidence of links to the September 11 attacks would be highly problematic for France and Germany and that only British Prime Minister Tony Blair, at substantial political cost, would support a U.S. attack.
A March 8, 2002 document by the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Overseas and Defense. The paper notes, The US administration has lost faith in containment and is now considering regime change. The paper reads, A legal justification for invasion would be needed and that none currently exists. The Cabinet Office analysts recommended a staged approach to establish international support, which would anyway be consonant with the requirement for a six-month interval to prepare for military action.
The Dodgy Dossier. A covering note and draft U.K. white paper: British Government briefing paper on Iraq – 03 June 2002. This is the earliest publicly available version of the document that became the U.K. dossier on Iraqs weapons of mass destruction published in September 2002. It was described in a covering note as a consolidated draft of Iraq papers as produced by CIC. The draft refers obliquely to Iraqs attempts to acquire: specialised aluminium [British spelling] which is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium.
The term Dodgy Dossier was first coined by online polemical magazine Spiked in relation to the September Dossier. The term was later employed by Channel 4 News when its reporter, Julian Rush, was made aware of Glen Rangwalas discovery that much of the work in the Iraq Dossier had been plagiarised from various unattributed sources including a 13-year-old thesis produced by a student at California State University. The most notable source was an article by then graduate student Ibrahim al-Marashi, entitled Iraqs Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis.
An August 4, 2002 Central Command briefing, Compartmented Concept Update. This set of briefing slides presents the overall concept for what would be known to military planners as the hybrid war plan, in which war would be launched before forces had reached their full capability, and follow-on increments would supplement the initial attack. The briefing covered such issues as the phases of conflict, ending with a Phase IV occupation of Iraq, the time necessary to generate the forces and complete the buildup, and an overview of the military strategy used in the invasion.
A September 11, 2002 U.S. Treasury Department Memorandum Subject: Briefing for your lunch with Vice President Cheney on the economic impact of a war with Iraq. A memo for Treasury Secretary Paul ONeill from Richard Claudia, Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy.
The final release copy of the Dodgy Dossier British Government, dossier on Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction, DATE: September 24, 2002. The document that Tony Blair presented to parliament on September 24 made the case, as he put it, for dealing with Iraqs WMDand in reality for going to war. Blairs foreword to the dossier asserted that intelligence had established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had and was continuing to develop WMD, including weapons that could be launched within 45 minutes. The paper was declared to be based on authentic assessments from within the British intelligence community.
October 4, 2002 CIA white paper, Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. This CIA paper was published two days after the NIE that was being prepared on the same subject. By comparison with the July draft, it had been significantly strengthened. The worst-case nuclear timeline of within a year had been added, along with reference to the aluminum tubes.
The complete collection can be obtained at: