The American choice on October 22 to blacklist Russia’s energy giants Rosneft and Lukoil marks a substantial escalation in financial sanctions targeted at Russia, as these 2 business together represent 57% of Russia’s petroleum output and export income. While smaller sized Russian companies, accountable for the staying 43%, stay unauthorized by the United States in the meantime, the effect of this relocation is extensive for significant oil getting nations such as India. Indian oil business have actually currently revealed that they will stop buying Russian oil to prevent prospective sanctions. This shift is specifically significant considered that Russia’s share in India’s unrefined imports rose from a simple 1% to an all-time high of 38% following the Ukraine war. While the Donald Trump administration declared that India was indirectly supporting Putin’s war efforts by purchasing Russian oil, New Delhi’s position was just driven by the pursuit of inexpensive energy sources readily available at the time.
< source media ="(max-width:767px)" alt ="The key criterion for India’s decision on buying Russian oil should not be whether it is done under US pressure or not. (REUTERS)" title ="The key criterion for India’s decision on buying Russian oil should not be whether it is done under US pressure or not. (REUTERS)"> < img src ="https://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-img/img/2025/10/27/550x309/The-key-criterion-for-India-s-decision-on-buying-R_1761579351613.jpg"alt ="The key criterion for India’s decision on buying Russian oil should not be whether it is done under US pressure or not. (REUTERS)"title ="The key criterion for India’s decision on buying Russian oil should not be whether it is done under US pressure or not. (REUTERS)"> India deals with a problem: Should it continue purchasing Russian oil one method or another, or stop its imports completely? For sure, the United States has no right to determine how 2 sovereign countries perform their bilateral trade. While Russian business have actually been approved by the United States, Moscow has no objective of stopping its oil exports. It is for the importing nations, such as India and China, to choose whether they want to run the risk of possible secondary sanctions from the United States for working with the approved Russian entities.
That stated, India presently has 2 alternatives. The very first is to continue acquiring Russian oil, which will be readily available in spite of American sanctions. In doing so, Indian purchasers might try to bypass United States sanction by sourcing oil through intermediaries, preventing direct negotiations that might draw attention and attendant sanctions. India might likewise take advantage of the existing shadow fleets to bring Russian oil discreetly to its refineries. While these methods might assist keep energy supply, they likewise run the risk of provoking Trump’s ire and prospective sanctions.
Similarly notably, defying American sanctions, specifically those enforced by a mercurial Trump might not be the most intelligent strategy. Pressing versus Trump belongs to banging one’s head versus a stone wall– it is neither reliable nor sensible. Even China, which has substantially more take advantage of over the United States than India, has so far suggested it is most likely to stop purchases from the approved Russian companies.
If choosing a battle with Trump makes little sense, India would be much better served by embracing a practical method to its Russian oil purchases: One that has the ability to stabilize diplomatic factors to consider, energy requirements, and financial interests without participating in unneeded conflicts that might hurt its wider tactical objectives. That is alternative second. This alternative associates with running within the restraints of the Trump administration’s sanctions on Russia. In geopolitics, you have fun with the cards you are dealt, not with the ones you long for, which might never ever be provided to you.
In a world of geopolitical pragmatism, the essential requirement for India’s choice on purchasing Russian oil must not be whether it is done under United States pressure or not, rather which of the readily available options will provide the optimum advantage to India. A practical technique to stabilize United States sanctions and India’s nationwide interests would include a series of computed procedures. Let’s think about a few of them.
One, New Delhi can still purchase oil from non-sanctioned Russian energy business. Rosneft and Lukoil, the 2 approved Russian oil majors, there are still other non-sanctioned entities who India can purchase oil from without drawing in American secondary sanctions. It’s the 2 Russian companies that are approved, not Russian oil per seThis is nevertheless simpler stated than done.
2, seeing the problem of Russian oil in seclusion would be short-sighted. India’s choice to buy Russian oil or not needs to be thought about in the wider context of its capability to press back versus United States sanctions, the probability of the success of such pushback, and the effect on India’s bigger tactical interests vis-à-vis the United States.
To put it simply, New Delhi need to consider its wider interests vis-à-vis the United States when choosing whether to follow the American sanctions on Russia. For India, the top priority is protecting a beneficial trade contract with Washington and guaranteeing the United States eliminates the extra 25% tariff enforced by the Trump administration for purchasing Russian oil. If Delhi works out skillfully, a trade offer might cut the 25% tariff troubled Indian items under Trump’s very first tariff choice, while stopping Russian oil purchases may decrease to eliminate the extra 25% enforced later on. Put in a different way, India must think about stopping its Russian oil purchases in exchange for a beneficial trade handle the United States.
New Delhi likewise has other medium-term interests vis-à-vis the United States. While pressing back versus Trump’s unilateral sanctions may undoubtedly increase our nationwide pride, concrete advantages of nationwide pride are usually restricted, and the dangers far surpass the gains. Rather, Delhi must think about providing to stop purchasing approved Russian oil in exchange for a shift in United States policy, i.e., an end to Trump’s negative geopolitical position towards India in South Asia. India must look for United States cooperation to bring back a beneficial local balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, guaranteeing that their tactical interests are lined up in the more comprehensive local context.
To be clear, New Delhi has actually restricted choices when it concerns defying American sanctions on Russian oil business. It needs to make a virtue out of requirement by engaging with the Trump administration and proposing that India will comply with United States sanctions in exchange for the United States dealing with India’s essential tactical interests. Geopolitics and nationwide interests need practical, realist methods instead of efforts to massage nationwide egos.
Happymon Jacob is identified going to teacher, Shiv Nadar University, founder-director, Council for Strategic and Defense Research, and editor, INDIA’S WORLD publication. The views revealed are individual